The investigation into the causes and factors that led to this accident was hampered by the minimal amount of accurate information provided by the accident aircraft's five-parameter foil-type FDR and the partially unserviceable CVR. The FDR provided only gross indications of the aircraft's performance during take-off. There were no indications of engine performance or systems operation. In the absence of such information, the Board had to use other, less reliable and more time-consuming methods in an effort to determine the seauence of events leading up to the accident.

The CVR apparently had an unserviceable cockpit area microphone. Consequently, there was no recording of flight crew conversation from the time pre-flight checks were commenced until the aircraft crashed. Had such information been available, the Board would have obtained greater insight into crew actions and flight management problems.

The Board notes with concern that the DC-8 Minimum Equipment List approved by the FAA permits operation of a DC-8 aircraft when both the FDR and CVR are unserviceable and that current regulations do not require CVRs to be functionally checked by flight crews before flight.