In the initial phase of the investigation into the causes and factors that led to this occurrence, a safety deficiency was identified in the methods used by Arrow Air flight crews for determining the take-off weight of the aircraft.

On 13 February 1986, as a consequence of these initial concerns, the CASB recommended that:

The Department of Transport review company documentation for Canadian air carriers to confirm the adequacy of provisions for the use of actual weights (versus standard average weights) and that the associated load calculation forms reflect the basis for the load determinations; and

CASB 86-01

The Department of Transport re-emphasize to each carrier the need to use actual weights for passengers, if the passenger load is likely to deviate from standard weights.

CASB 86-02

In addition, the CASB recommended that:

The National Transportation Safety Board consider issuing parallel recommendations to CASB86-01 and 86-02 above, requiring similar action for American-registered air carriers.

CASB 86-02

These three recommendations have been fully implemented to the Board's satisfaction.

At the time of the accident, the U.S. Master Minimum Equipment List permitted certain aircraft types such as the DC-8 to be released for flight with an unserviceable flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder. NTSB and FAA involvement in this investigation led to FAA action to rectify this deficiency, and, on 15 December 1987, the FAA adopted a policy that the U.S. Master Minimum Equipment List require those previously exempted aircraft types to be equipped with at least one serviceable and functioning recorder.